Challenges of Multi-Factor Authentication for Securing Advanced IoT
  (A-IoT) Applications by Ometov, Aleksandr et al.
1Challenges of Multi-Factor Authentication for
Securing Advanced IoT (A-IoT) Applications
Aleksandr Ometov, Vitaly Petrov, Sergey Bezzateev,
Sergey Andreev, Yevgeni Koucheryavy, and Mario Gerla
Abstract—The unprecedented proliferation of smart devices
together with novel communication, computing, and control
technologies have paved the way for the Advanced Internet of
Things (A-IoT). This development involves new categories of
capable devices, such as high-end wearables, smart vehicles, and
consumer drones aiming to enable efficient and collaborative
utilization within the Smart City paradigm. While massive
deployments of these objects may enrich people’s lives, unau-
thorized access to the said equipment is potentially dangerous.
Hence, highly-secure human authentication mechanisms have to
be designed. At the same time, human beings desire comfortable
interaction with their owned devices on a daily basis, thus
demanding the authentication procedures to be seamless and
user-friendly, mindful of the contemporary urban dynamics.
In response to these unique challenges, this work advocates
for the adoption of multi-factor authentication for A-IoT, such
that multiple heterogeneous methods – both well-established and
emerging – are combined intelligently to grant or deny access
reliably. We thus discuss the pros and cons of various solutions
as well as introduce tools to combine the authentication factors,
with an emphasis on challenging Smart City environments. We
finally outline the open questions to shape future research efforts
in this emerging field.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
The vision of the Internet of Things (IoT) opens a new
era of technology penetration into the human lives, which
touches upon a wide range of use cases: from Smart Home to
Smart City and from Smart Grid to Factory Automation [1].
The numbers of IoT devices that can collect, store, combine,
and analyze the massive amounts of data around them by
producing valuable knowledge and making relevant actions is
growing uncontrollably in an attempt to offer decisive societal
benefits while handling both routine and critical tasks across
multiple verticals [2].
As it simplifies the lives of people, the IoT also brings
unprecedented security and privacy risks, since close to any
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object around us becomes interconnected with others to col-
lect and process sensitive information [3]. The conventional
massive IoT involves numerous low-cost devices (e.g., sen-
sors, actuators, and smart meters), with limited computational
capabilities and stringent power constraints; hence, the tradi-
tional security and privacy solutions had to be reconsidered
and adjusted to the specifics of massive IoT. Over recent
decades, security and privacy in IoT remained a major re-
search topic subject to heated discussions, e.g., in the area
of lightweight cryptography [4], secure connection and trust
establishment [5], and privacy-preserving data processing [6].
While there are multiple open problems yet to be resolved, the
current progress in this field promises to provide the demanded
levels of security to these massive IoT deployments.
Meanwhile, in contrast to the massive and low-cost IoT
solutions, an emerging trend in today’s IoT is a rapid pro-
liferation of high-end IoT equipment that features more capa-
ble connected devices. These include sophisticated wearables
(including augmented, virtual, and mixed reality systems),
smart vehicles, and consumer drones (see Fig. 1) – that may
collectively be named Advanced IoT (A-IoT). These relatively
high-cost devices have more abundant performance, memory,
and battery resources to execute full-scale security and pri-
vacy protocols; thus, the establishment of secure machine-to-
machine connections may not be a challenging problem for
the A-IoT.
Consumer Drones
Smart VehiclesHi-End Wearables
Fig. 1. Human-centric Advanced IoT (A-IoT) applications in a Smart City.
At the same time, a number of specific security and
privacy concerns emerge in connection with such systems.
Since unauthorized access to these powerful devices may
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2lead to severe risks that range from theft of this high-cost
equipment (drones or cars) and up to putting human lives in
danger by, e.g., manipulating with the information projected to
the augmented reality grasses or maneuvering smart vehicles
uncontrollably [7]. Therefore, reliable assessment of the fact of
ownership for the A-IoT devices that belong to both personal
and collective use becomes one of the critical challenges that
is faced today, which is very different from massive IoT.
In this work, we first systematically review the unprece-
dented research challenges related to determining the human
ownership of the A-IoT systems. We then classify the specific
features of the A-IoT that can be employed to securely
verify the fact of ownership of the A-IoT devices and map
them onto the challenges by illustrating how the features can
complement each other while covering the potential issues. We
also discuss the concept of multi-factor human authentication
with the A-IoT system, where multiple heterogeneous factors
are intelligently combined to achieve higher levels of security
while not compromising the usability of the A-IoT services.
We finally enumerate the important practical matters to be
resolved on the way towards successful implementation of the
introduced concept.
II. CHALLENGES OF DETERMINING OWNERSHIP IN A-IOT
As unauthorized access to A-IoT systems brings severe
security threats, the challenge of reliable access control be-
comes one of the most crucial research problems for securing
A-IoT solutions. An access control procedure can generally
be decomposed into user authentication and authorization.
The second stage is relatively less complicated and can be
implemented by conventional discretionary, mandatory, or
role-based access control methods. However, the first stage
introduces a number of A-IoT-specific research questions that
we carefully review in this section.
A. Multi-Modality of Human-Computer Interaction
Today, most of the conventional ICT systems are equipped
with advanced input devices, such as keyboards and touch-
screens, as well as output devices, most commonly, LCD
screens used for human-computer interaction (HCI). Since
textual input remains the dominating form of HCI, these
systems have historically been adopted for authentication pur-
poses: memorable textual or numerical passwords, possibility
to display a hint or advanced visual instructions, etc.
In contrast, the very nature of authentication does not
imply text-based commands or responses. Very few of the
emerging IoT devices are controlled by a keyboard; hence,
the authentication methods based on textual passwords will
need to evolve accordingly for them to continue being usable
on the mass IoT market.
B. Robustness to Environment and User Behavior
The authentication process of today is typically applied in
dedicated, comfortable, and stationary environments. Many
such actions occur indoors, where neither weather conditions
nor other unpredictable factors can impact the authentication
decisions. Even when this process happens outdoors, the input
devices to enter the security credentials acquire additional
protection to resist the environmental changes up to a cer-
tain extent.
However, the A-IoT systems in Smart Cities are mobile
by design. Their interactions with a user are spontaneous
and occur in uncontrolled and unpredictable environments.
Moreover, even under regular weather/environment conditions,
the initial state as the user begins interacting with the A-
IoT system may be notably different. For example, the user
opening a vehicle may be wearing gloves during winter time,
such that a fingerprint scanner installed on the door handle
may not be available. Therefore, authentication of A-IoT
devices must be made robust to both dynamic environmental
conditions and flexible user behavior.
C. High Levels of Reliance and Trust
Broad penetration of ICT systems on the consumer market
and their role in the daily human life have always been
associated with a level of trust that people grant to these sys-
tems. High trust is impossible to achieve without appropriate
authentication and authorization procedures [8].
At the same time, the A-IoT systems are more elaborate
than the ICT platforms of today. They are often granted direct
access to sensitive personal information; hence, the data they
collect and handle should not be made available to potential
third parties. On the other hand, large vehicles, drones, and
industrial robots represent more capable platforms, sometimes
termed as sources of increased danger. This recognizes that
they may become hazardous as long as health and even lives
of humans are concerned. Therefore, A-IoT systems have
to be featured with more secure and reliable authentication
procedures, so that they are capable of distinguishing their
valid user from an unauthorized adversary.
D. Constrained Response Times and Usability
Regardless of their stringent security demands, the response
levels of A-IoT authentication are also crucial for its successful
adoption. Previously, authentication process was a dedicated
phase of the HCI, thus making users prepare for it both
physically and mentally: recall the secret phrase, bring the
token key, etc. With further development and penetration
of the A-IoT systems, they become more ubiquitous and
omnipresent. In future Smart Cities, users will be interacting
with various A-IoT devices numerous times a day; hence, they
cannot afford to spend several second by authenticating with
each of those and tolerate second-long delays in acquiring
access.
In response to these demands, A-IoT authentication must
evolve to become capable of operating within stringent time
intervals, preferably in an inconspicuous form, i.e., transparent
to the user. For multi-functional A-IoT systems, this may
even bring the need to temporarily provide access to certain
basic functionality sooner, while more rigorous authentication
is performed in the background. This is because the users
are unlikely to require sensitive actions from the very first
moments of their interaction with the target A-IoT platform.
3From the above, it follows that designing adequate A-IoT
authentication mechanisms is challenging. However, the more
advanced capabilities and functions of A-IoT devices can be
beneficial when coining novel authentication schemes and we
review these in the next section.
III. ENABLERS FOR IMPROVED A-IOT AUTHENTICATION
Reliable human user authentication by the A-IoT system is
a complex task due to various challenges as discussed previ-
ously. Fortunately, modern A-IoT platforms feature a number
of dedicated input devices as well as rich sensing, com-
munication, and computation capabilities, which altogether
can be employed during the authentication stage. Various
user authentication methods become suitable for new A-IoT
systems utilizing this diverse functionality. In this section, we
discuss these authentication methods and their applicability
in the A-IoT systems. For convenience, we sort them by
following their mass adoption: from well-known to emerging,
see Table I.
TABLE I
AUTHENTICATION FACTORS SUITABLE FOR A-IOT.
TYPE: K – KNOWLEDGE; O – OWNERSHIP; BI – BIOMETRIC;
BE – BEHAVIOR. ACTION: A – ACTIVE; P – PASSIVE.
DURATION: S – SHORT (< 1 SEC); M – MEDIUM (1−15 SEC);
L – LONG (> 15 SEC).
Factor Type Action Duration
PIN code K A S
Password K A M
Token O P S
Voice BI/BE A/P S/M
Facial BI A/P S/M
Ocular-based BI A S/M
Fingerprint BI A/P S
Hand geometry BI A/P S
Geographical location BE P L
Vein recognition BI A/P S
Thermal image BI/BE P S/M
Behavior patterns BE P L
Weight BI P S
Electrocardiographic (ECG)
recognition BI/BE P S-L
A. Review of Possible Enablers
1) Hardware tokens: The automotive cluster has its legacy
security mechanisms, primarily centered around the use of
hardware tokens that represent the ownership factor. Recently,
such tokens have been complemented by increasingly pop-
ular software-based replacements installed on smartphones1.
By leveraging this concept, the A-IoT systems can make a
step forward and utilize the tokens placed not only in the
smartphones but also on wearable devices.
1F. Lardinois, “BMW wants to turn your smart-
phone into your car key,” https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/26/
bmw-wants-to-turn-your-smartphone-into-your-car-key/ [Accessed Novem-
ber 2018]
2) Memorable passwords/PINs: Utilization of conven-
tional PINs is currently acceptable worldwide owing to the
widespread adoption of ATMs and early-mobile phone era.
A combination of button presses to unlock a feature (e.g.,
engine start) or to access a restricted area in addition to the
key are typical solutions. Finally, knowledge-based approaches
are used widely to access a web-service. The A-IoT systems
may intelligently utilize similar solutions as well, where pass-
word inputs can effectively become replaced by the use of
touchscreen (where applicable) or, e.g., audio forms of input.
3) Fingerprint/palm/eye scanner: While core technology
principles for fingerprint and palm recognition have been
known for already a while, the recent achievements in the
respective miniaturization made them accessible by a wide
range of consumer products, namely, smartphones. Installation
of biometric scanning devices within a conventional input
interface (e.g., Home button in Apple iPhones) or behind a
touchscreen is not a science fiction anymore2. Hence, the
authentication process can become transparent for the user,
thus improving the overall system usability.
4) Facial recognition: The methods of facial recognition by
built-in video cameras originally started with landmark picture
analysis, which appeared to be vulnerable to trivial attacks
of, e.g., presenting a photo instead of the real face. Over
the last two decades, these tools have significantly developed
towards three-dimensional face and expression recognition that
is much more resilient to such attacks. The security levels can
be enhanced further by prompting the user to move the head
in a specific manner so that a particular pattern to follow is not
known in advance [9]. Solving this task from another angle,
a drone can fly around the user to construct a 3D map of
face/body without making the user move.
5) Voice recognition: All of the considered A-IoT de-
vices are typically equipped with a microphone that enables
voice recognition. The recently announced implementations
are capable of distinguishing millions of different voices after
capturing only a short phrase. These solutions are however
more vulnerable to a ‘spoofing attack’ than facial recognition.
The attack itself could be described as Eve intercepting or
capturing digital or analog Alice’s voice signal and “spoofing”
own message into the authentication sensor in the real time
(using artificial, synthesized voice) or replicating it later on.
While it is technically possible for an adversary to construct
a phrase based on the recorded pronunciation of syllables and
sounds, the A-IoT systems are likely to have sufficient com-
putational power for timely recognition of the corresponding
attacks.
6) Data from wearables: The A-IoT devices may also
employ their advanced communication capabilities. Particu-
larly, if the authenticating user holds wearable devices, they
could act as providers of the authentication factors [10], such
as gesture analysis, Electrocardiographic (ECG) Recognition,
Geographical Location analysis, etc. Being connected to the
A-IoT system via a short-range radio, wearables can present
2V. Savov, “I tried the first phone with an in-display fin-
gerprint sensor,” https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/1/9/
16867536/vivo-fingerprint-reader-integrated-display-biometric-ces-2018
[Accessed November 2018]
4TABLE II
COMPARING A-IOT AUTHENTICATION METHODS
Authentication
method Non-text input Short contact time Stringent usability Environmental robustness High security level
Hardware tokens + + - + -
Password/PIN - + - + -
Fingerprint/Palm
scanner + + +/- - +
Facial recognition + - + - +
Voice recognition + - +/- + +/-
Data from wearables + + - - +
Behavior patterns + - + - +
the security credentials of their user, such as heart rate or elec-
trocardiogram. The utilization of this method requires support
from appropriate security protocols, so that the platform may
trust the data collected by the user-controlled equipment on
the one hand, and the users can be certain that their sensitive
personal information is not disclosed, on the other.
7) Behavioral patterns: The A-IoT system can utilize one
or several input interfaces to record and analyze the individual
features of user behavior: response time to typical requests,
typing rhythm, micro- or macro-scale mobility, etc. Here, the
choice of particular factors to monitor highly depends on the
form-factor of the A-IoT device: for wearable electronics these
could be accelerometer fingerprinting, for drones they are the
control operations, while for smart vehicles there are plenty of
options that range from brake pressure and position of hands
on the wheel to musical and radio preferences.
B. Mapping Enablers onto Challenges
While each of the A-IoT-specific authentication methods can
bring its additional benefits, none of them alone is capable
of efficiently resolving all of the discussed A-IoT challenges.
To this end, Table II offers a mapping of the authentication
methods onto the challenges introduced in Section II.
Notably, knowledge-based methods have their most severe
limitations with usability and security requirements [11], since
the user is expected to create, remember, and timely update
the secret passwords for all A-IoT devices. In this case, it
is very likely that the same password will be selected for
multiple systems, which degrades the levels of security. In
contrast, hardware tokens are more scalable to be used for
multiple A-IoT systems. However, the security levels may still
be insufficient as the token(s) can easily be stolen.
Biometrics allow to be authenticated without an additional
device or knowledge, but the fingerprint, ocular scanning, or
voice recognition may require further effort from the user
(e.g., remove gloves or glasses, say a particular phrase, etc.)
as well as remain not fully robust to the environmental
conditions. Finally, the risk of losing a biometric template
has to be considered. Then, authentication with wearable data
has a significant advantage over the conventional voice/face
recognition, since the user is not required to perform any
explicit action. Meanwhile, this method has similar drawbacks
as do the tokens, where the user has to carry the necessary
devices continuously, always turned on and charged.
Drones
Wearables Passwords
Fingerprint
Collected
factor data
AR glasses
Decision
Tokens
Voice
Facial
Video
surveillance
Intelligent
Authentication
F(x )i
Fig. 2. Heterogeneous MFA for A-IoT (by example of smart vehicles).
The methods of behavior recognition allow for mitigating
most of the constraints by observing the user behavior over
a certain period. However, the amounts of time necessary for
such monitoring are at least an order of magnitude higher than
those for other methods, which may become a severe usability
concern in delay-sensitive A-IoT applications. Furthermore,
behavior recognition is a complex task from the algorithm
design perspective, as there should be a constructive differen-
tiation between a valid deviation in the monitored factor by
the actual user and invalid patterns by adversaries.
As can be concluded from our analysis and Table II, neither
of the presented methods alone is sufficient to effectively
authenticate the user over a broad range of possible scenarios
related to the A-IoT systems. In the following section, we
propose a novel approach to construct reliable authentication
solutions for A-IoT devices by intelligently combining mul-
tiple potentially unreliable methods, which follows the multi-
factor authentication (MFA) paradigm.
IV. USE OF MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION FOR A-IOT
Since no single authentication method is likely to be suitable
to resolve all of A-IoT challenges, the use of MFA is a natural
approach to construct compound solutions (see Fig. 2). At
the same time, designing adequate MFA mechanisms is a
complex matter, which calls for careful selection, harmoniza-
tion, and combination of various individual methods, such
that the resulting solution could outperform its component
elements concerning both security and usability, as confirmed
by experiments in, for example, [12]. Below, we summarize
the four fundamental design principles to be considered when
building A-IoT-ready MFA solutions.
5A. Means to Compare
Before combining several heterogeneous authentication
methods, one needs to harmonize across them, such that
knowledge-based methods could be integrated with, e.g.,
biometric and ownership schemes within a single-stop A-
IoT authentication mechanism. Importantly, the output of the
overwhelming majority of individual authentication solutions
is binary: either acceptance or rejection, i.e., {0;1}. In rare
cases, a continuous variable that characterizes the “likelihood”
([0;1]) could be retrieved from certain biometric systems.
However, most vendors do not provide with access to those
values but rather convert the likelihood factor into a binary
decision internally.
In addition to the output data format, alternative methods
can be characterized by their accuracy, which is typically esti-
mated with two probabilities: (i) false acceptance rate (FAR),
the probability that an unauthorized user is accepted; and
(ii) false rejection rate (FRR), the probability that a valid
user is rejected. These reflect two major qualities of an
authentication system: security (FAR) and usability (FRR). We
here advocate their generalization to knowledge and owner-
ship methods.
For instance, in password-based protection, FAR may corre-
spond to the probability of guessing the secret, while FRR may
characterize the possibility of making an accidental mistake
during input. In turn, FAR and FRR may also reflect the
chances for a token to be stolen or lost for ownership factors.
Therefore, we conclude that all of the discussed authentication
methods can be well-represented in a unified output format and
supplemented with their suitable FAR/FRR values.
B. Means to Combine
The use of several individual authentication methods does
not offer immediate advantages, since it still remains unclear
how to combine them efficiently. At the first glance, one may
come up with either of the two extreme strategies: “A user
should successfully pass ALL the checks to receive access”
(All) and “A user should successfully pass ANY of the checks
to receive access” (Any).
Below, we present a typical example that numerically il-
lustrates the inherent weaknesses of these extreme strategies
as well as emphasizes the importance of a certain level
of intelligence when deriving the resulting decision from a
number of individual outcomes by the component methods.
We assume a number of factors, each characterized by its own
FAR and FRR values. For simplicity, we require that all the
FARs are equal to 0.03%, whereas all the FRRs are equal
to 2%. The Law of Total Probability then derives the resultant
values for FAR/FRR.
Observing Fig. 3, the All approach has the lowest FAR,
thus yielding the best security level. However, its FRR is
higher than with other approaches, by reaching over 12%
with 7 independent factors combined. Hence, the usability of
All approach remains low, which makes it non-applicable in
the A-IoT context. Further, we notice the opposite trend for
the Any approach that increases the FAR value at the expense
of much better FRR. Therefore, Any solution is not applicable
1 3 5 7
Number of combined factors
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
F
A
R
,F
R
R
FRR, Single
FAR, Single
FRR, All
FAR, All
FRR, Any
FAR, Any
FRR, Balanced
FAR, Balanced
104 Gain
108 Gain
Fig. 3. Comparing alternative factor combining approaches.
either. Consequently, none of the trivial MFA combinations
are directly usable in the challenging A-IoT scenarios.
In contrast, a more intelligent Balanced approach – “A user
should successfully pass most of the checks to receive ac-
cess” – constitutes a viable compromise between security and
usability, by decreasing both FAR and FRR indicators. The
quantitative gains highly depend on the input parameters and
reach 104 vs. 108 when 7 factors are combined. This example
also highlights the importance of a threshold value selection,
since incorrect combining may often result in rapid system
performance degradation [10]. The same holds true for any
other values of FAR/FRR, even though they may actually vary
for different factors.
C. Means to Evaluate
Given that A-IoT scenarios are highly heterogeneous, the
results delivered by the individual devices should not lead
to blind acceptance/rejection decisions. Instead, additional
data must be considered when comparing the output of the
authentication function against a threshold value.
1) Binary decision: The first and foremost sub-factor to
be considered is binary decisions delivered by the individual
devices.
2) Vendor-specific metrics: The second sub-factor is the
level of accuracy, which is directly related to FAR/FRR
parameters. For example, the data collected with cameras by
various vendors may deliver different probabilities during a
facial recognition event for the same user.
3) Level of trust: Many factors may impact user and device
trust. Here, trust in the “owned” devices (e.g., built-in cameras)
should be valued higher than that in external equipment. Fur-
ther, historically familiar devices may have higher trust levels
than stranger equipment, see the paradigm of Social IoT [13].
A significant benefit may be made available by utilizing social
networks, since the devices owned by a friend or a colleague
may also be considered as more trustworthy.
The set of selected sub-factors can significantly affect the
operation of the authentication solution. However, the above
three factors are relatively stable – the overall changes in
the A-IoT system from these perspectives are not as abrupt
and thus could be determined in advance. Conversely, the
authentication system designer should be provided with a
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Fig. 4. Considered phases of time-separated MFA for A-IoT.
higher level of flexibility for a given application. This could be
achieved by adding another dimension – specific factor weight
per application (or even per user).
Accordingly, the general authentication function is to be
considered as ∑δiµiτiϕi > T, where i is the factor number,
δi is a binary decision, µi is the accuracy level provided by
the vendor, τi is the trust level to the selected source, ϕi is
the factor weight, and T is the system-wide threshold set by
the designer. Hence, the system may be adjusted per device,
while the ultimate decision can be made flexible based on
statistical analysis and machine learning techniques. Finally,
the use of various factors consumes different amounts of time,
see Table I.
D. Means to Evolve
The conventional ICT systems typically exploit a single-
stage authentication method, such that the user is either
granted or denied access as the result of authentication. In
contrast, the more stringent time constraints of A-IoT authenti-
cation dictate the need to complement the main authentication
phase with additional checks that happen before and/or after it.
Here, the considered MFA solution may benefit from a range
of sensing devices widely deployed in Smart Cities as well as
exploit the very nature of the human interaction with the A-
IoT system. Therefore, the overall authentication process can
be divided into several phases and, consequently, the level of
trust to the user begins to evolve in time.
1) Pre-authentication phase: This phase is the most dy-
namic and unpredictable as a person ‘approaches’ the target
vehicle. Here, the surrounding environment plays a crucial
role by providing with additional information. The only option
during this phase is to utilize passive authentication strategies,
i.e., ‘observe’ the user biometrics/behavior that could be
delivered by user-worn wearables, user-carried deceives, and
other vehicles/infrastructure in proximity.
2) Active authentication phase: The most conventional
phase relies upon active interaction. Hence, the user provides
relevant input to the system directly. The most suitable au-
thentication methods are knowledge- and biometrics-based.
3) Continuous (post) authentication phase: Another key
part of the envisioned A-IoT authentication process is con-
tinuous monitoring of the fact that the user remains legitimate
to operate the system even after the previous phases are
completed successfully [14]. Monitoring and analyzing the
subject by the smart vehicle, infrastructure, and other cars
become a preferred option. Consider a case where the driver
has provided all of the tokens, passed all of the biometric
tests but faced a seizure during a highway trip. In this case,
the vehicle may automatically overtake the control, connect to
the neighboring cars, and safely stop by the wayside. As an
example, recent works confirm that it is necessary to monitor
the driver for just under 2.5 minutes in order to validate the
behavior with 95% accuracy [15].
V. ECOSYSTEM OF MFA-POWERED A-IOT
The previous section summarized the underlying design
principles of the MFA solutions in A-IoT, at large. However,
even if these principles are followed, further development and
mass adoption of MFA-powered A-IoT systems should be
considered in perspective. This section brings the community’s
attention to the most significant questions to be answered in
this context.
1) How to weigh factors?: While the MFA concept offers
sufficient flexibility to adapt the authentication system to a
wide range of possible scenarios, the choice of particular
numerical weights and threshold values requires an extensive
study, which needs to carefully balance the FAR and FRR
values of the resulting system depending on the target use
case. The system should also be made reconfigurable, such
7that its internal parameters are updated appropriately when-
ever an A-IoT device is, e.g., sold to another person with
different attributes.
2) How to adapt decisions?: Another critical challenge
is dynamic system adaptation in relation to a number of
factors involved in the authentication process. For instance,
recognition based on a video camera may be unavailable at
nighttime or in bad weather. Hence, the decision function
should dynamically adjust the weights of the factors that are
available during the authentication process based on contextual
data. This task is much more challenging as compared to
conventional single- and two-factor authentication with only
a few static factors involved.
3) How to earn user trust?: The next question is related to
making a legitimate user trust the system in its operations.
For example, the user had a video surveillance camera at
the parking near home, which contributed 20% to the overall
authentication process, while the threshold was configured to
grant access. Then, the user moved the car to another address
and cannot open it anymore without an additional weight
from the infrastructure, since there is no external camera
nearby to participate in the authentication process. Hence, it
is crucial that the decision-making process be at least partially
transparent to the user.
4) How to receive assistance?: The A-IoT framework
involves not only in-built authentication factors but also data
from proximate sources. Therefore, a question remains of
how secure and trusted such assistance from the neighboring
devices could be. Our illustrative example considered above
receives additional data from the wearable devices owned by
the human user; the camera mounted on a lamp post; a surveil-
lance drone patrolling the street, etc. Hence, designing secure
and reliable methods to deliver the sensitive authentication
data from these dissimilar Smart City devices to the target
A-IoT system – while not compromising the user privacy for
third-party entities – is an open problem.
5) How to delegate A-IoT devices?: Users tend to share
their devices both privately (family) and publicly (car rent).
However, secure collective delegation of use is not straight-
forward for the A-IoT systems. Conventional landing of a
physical token may not be a sufficient option anymore, since
it does not necessarily verify the right to operate the A-IoT
device. From the A-IoT platform perspective, most of the
factors related to its temporary user.
VI. CONCLUSION AND STANDARDIZATION ASPECTS
Reliable and secure human authentication by various smart
devices is one of the key drivers in the Advanced IoT era.
From the standardization perspective, there is a number
of regional specifications and recommendations related to
multi-factor authentication. However, most of them are still
in their early development phases. For example, Payment
Card Industry Security Standards Council provides recom-
mendations for the MFA system implementation3 and also
partially touches upon the MFA-related topic in terms of
3“PCI Security Standards Council: Guidance for Multi-
Factor Authentication,” https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/
Multi-Factor-Authentication-Guidance-v1.pdf [Accessed November 2018]
the requirements related to the utilization of MFA for card
payments in PCI DSS v3.2. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) provides MFA-related guidelines4
in NIST Special Publications 800-63B and 800-63C with a
detailed overview of the technical requirements for federal
agencies implementing digital identity in the US. Overall,
these documents support the discussion provided in this work.
However, so far there is no unified standard for the MFA
system developers to follow.
In this article, we reviewed the existing research challenges
and possible enablers for user authentication within the A-
IoT ecosystem. We introduced a concept of multi-factor au-
thentication for A-IoT as an attractive alternative to existing
single-factor solutions with limited potential. The fundamental
design principles of MFA were highlighted by providing useful
insights into facilitation of future MFA applications for the A-
IoT. Finally, key open questions related to the development,
practical implementation, and adoption of MFA for diverse
A-IoT systems were discussed together with potential use
cases, thus laying the foundation for further research in this
emerging area.
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